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PURPOSE FOR AND WITHIN CREATION: 




Although many believe that modern evolutionary biology renders teleology superfluous, this article explores the recent 
resurgence of attempts to locate teleology, functions, and purpose in the nature of organisms. This essay further explores 
the relevance of teleology within Catholic, Protestant, and Eastern Orthodox traditions, and the ways in which some 
theological doctrines have been construed against a teleological conception of both humanity and the wider cosmos. It 
also defends the reality of intrinsic teleology against an evolutionary- reductionist accommodation strategy, and responds 
to the accusation that a theological affirmation of purpose within biological organisms entails the thorny position of 
intelligent design.
Introduction
It is commonly assumed that the rise of modern science and evolutionary biology entailed the 
demise of teleology. The received narrative is that the shift to mechanism meant that final 
causation was subsumed under efficient causation. Darwinian evolution provided a new frame-
work for explaining biological change and progression without the need for teleological catego-
ries of purposes, goals, and divine intentionality. This has led some thinkers to exclaim with 
striking confidence that the message of science is “absolutely clear: no teleology, no purposes, 
goals, or ends.”1
Given this development, some theologians have come to argue that whereas there is purpose 
for creation, there is no purpose in creation. This article will argue for the opposing position, 
namely that there are good philosophical reasons for affirming teleology within the natural world 
and that theologians ought to affirm the reality of intrinsic teleology. Consequently, those who 
reject intrinsic teleology in favour of reductionist and mechanistic categories need to acknowl-
edge the theological costs of such a move.
I begin by exploring the ways in which teleology has been connected with crucial theological 
doctrines and beliefs from the perspectives of Catholic, Protestant, as well as Eastern Orthodox 
1 Alex Rosenberg, The Atheist’s Guide to Reality: Enjoying Life without Illusions (New York: W.W Norton & 
Company, Inc., 2011), 43.
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traditions. Within these traditions, it is generally believed that teleology can shed light on the 
Christian affirmations regarding divine providence, creation, and human nature, and that some 
theological beliefs stand and fall with the possibility of viewing nature teleologically.
In the second part of this article I will explore recent accounts of natural teleology based on the 
notion of self- sustaining activity— most clearly manifested by the life and development of organ-
isms. I will argue that these accounts pave the way for an intrinsic teleology fruitful for upholding 
the strikingly teleological doctrines within Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestant thought.
In the third and final part of this article, I will analyse the possibility of upholding a balance 
between extrinsic and intrinsic teleology. If one places teleology in a theological setting and 
takes it to be a result of God’s action, then purposive phenomena are in some sense externally 
grounded— in the divine plan for creation. How, then, from a theological standpoint, do we make 
sense of intrinsic teleology? Does a theistic accommodation make intrinsic teleology untenable, 
and would a theological affirmation of teleology ultimately lead to Intelligent Design? I will 
discuss these issues in the last part of this essay.
Theological Voices on the Relevance of Teleology
Different theological traditions have, in diverse ways, emphasised the need for teleology to make 
sense of and articulate central Christian doctrines and ideas. A natural place to start, in order to 
explicate this claim, is natural law theory. Adherents to natural law theory are typically, but not 
always, Roman Catholic. Although many thinkers of the early Church reflected deeply on the 
nature of virtue and moral law, Thomas Aquinas provided much of the fundamentals of natural 
law theory by assimilating to the Christian tradition both Aristotelian and Neoplatonic meta-
physical frameworks.2
In a broad sense, natural law approaches to theological ethics seek to base moral law within 
the natural order and in continuation with human nature. Nature is morally prior to both positive 
law and social convention.3 First, Scholastic thought presupposes that there is such a thing as 
human nature and, second, that this nature is “accessible and intelligible” and “worth preserving 
and expressing.”4 It should be noted that the term “nature” usually has nothing to do with nature 
as we usually understand it. Rather, “natural law is said to be natural in the sense of being pre- 
conventional, and law in the sense that it is comprised of intrinsic, normative principles by which 
action should be regulated.”5 Typically, the natural law proponent seeks to articulate an account 
of moral theory whereby the appropriateness of an action is judged in relation to what it means 
to be a human being: what is morally good is, then, based on what is good for human beings, and 
many natural law proponents seek to connect moral goodness with that which can maximize 
flourishing for the human person. Indeed, “human happiness must be recognizable as a kind of 
flourishing appropriate to a creature that exists and lives and enjoys a distinctively animal life.”6 
As human nature includes both body and soul, we need to understand the human good in terms 
of material, spiritual, moral, and intellectual categories: “Human nature is oriented to lower 
2 Stephen Pope, “Reason and Natural Law,” in Oxford Handbook of Theological Ethics, eds. Gilbert Meilaender and 
William Werpehowski (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 150.
3 Ibid., 149.
4 Jean Porter, “The Natural Law and the Normative Significance of Nature,” Studies in Christian Ethics 26, no. 2 
(May 2013): 166- 173; 167.
5 Jean Porter, Natural and Divine Law: Reclaiming the Tradition for Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999), 51.
6 Jean Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of Natural Law (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2005), 82.
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goods (of the body), to relatively higher goods (of the soul), and to an ultimate good (God).”7 
Natural law is, therefore, how human beings come to manifest the divine image.
As both Stephen Pope and Jean Porter explain, this natural law conception of human nature is 
unashamedly teleological. For Pope, “Natural law ethics evaporates if nature is purposeless.”8 In 
fact, Pope contends that the “continued development of natural law ethics depends on re- 
establishing a sense of the purposefulness of the natural world in general and of human nature in 
particular.”9 The plausibility of natural law theory thus hinges on the possibility of maintaining 
a teleological view of the world.
We can find a similar sense of urgency expressed by the nineteenth- century Protestant philoso-
pher James McCosh, who noted that a potential Darwinian rejection of purpose within nature would 
have devastating effects for our theological endeavours to articulate God’s active presence in the 
world. McCosh argued forcefully against Charles Hodge’s view that evolutionary theory is equiva-
lent to atheistic materialism. Surely, God could have created everything within the world without 
any intermediary causes, but McCosh suggested that “[s]uch is God’s method of distributing causes 
throughout the cosmos. It is our business not to rebel against the plan, but to fall in with it and profit 
by it.”10 For Hodge, the Darwinian emphasis on natural selection excludes teleology, and so also the 
notion that the world owes its existence to divine design. Hodge, then, “pronounced Darwinism to 
be practically atheism, on the ground that it excluded teleological explanation from nature.”11 
McCosh countered Hodge’s sceptical view of evolution by showing that Darwin’s theory, far from 
excluding ends and purposes, gives evidence of divine intentionality and an immanent teleology: 
“Evolution does not lessen the force of the teleological argument” and the “theory of Evolution does 
not undermine or interfere in any way with the ordinary doctrine of Final Cause.”12 The force of the 
teleological argument is not “lessened by the circumstance that the skilful structures have been in-
herited.”13 Science therefore provides sophisticated reasons for thinking of nature as divinely cre-
ated, compared to Hodge’s conflict- thesis. As James C. Livingston explains with regard to McCosh’s 
theological accommodation of the mechanisms of evolution: “McCosh believed that this ‘wider’ 
teleology of an interconnected, unitary plan was more compelling for a natural theology . . .”14
This notion of a wider teleology was also emphasised by Aubrey Moore (1848- 1890), a Canon 
at Christ Church, Oxford, and one of the first “Christian Darwinians.” For Moore, Darwinian 
evolution did not pose a threat to Christian theology and the belief in a sustaining and active God. 
On the contrary, it allowed the Christian to reconceive divine providence in an immanent man-
ner, whereby God is seen as working through and in conjunction with the mechanisms of evolu-
tion. Moore banished the view of God as “an occasional visitor” by depicting divine providence 
as mediated through natural processes.15 Moore, who welcomed the evolutionary narrative, saw 
a wider teleology to confirm the Christian belief “that God acted constantly throughout nature. 
Natural selection, like all natural laws, was evidence of the action of the indwelling Logos . . .”16 
7 Pope, “Reason and Natural Law,” 152.
8 Ibid., 159.
9 Ibid., 160.
10 James McCosh, The Religious Aspect of Evolution (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1890), 3.
11 David Fergusson, The Providence of God: A Polyphonic Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2018), 168.
12 McCosh, The Religious Aspect of Evolution, 69.
13 Ibid.
14 James C. Livingston, “Natural Science and Theology,” in The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth- Century 
Theology, ed. David Fergusson (Oxford: Wiley- Blackwell, 2010), 156.
15 Fergusson, The Providence of God, 198.
16 Richard England, “Natural Selection, Teleology, and the Logos: From Darwin to the Oxford Neo- Darwinists, 
1859- 1909,” Osiris 16 (2001): 270- 287; 271.
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Darwin’s discovery enabled a richer and more immanent teleology, which provided new re-
sources for framing God’s action in an evolutionary world.
Alister McGrath has in recent publications argued for the compatibility between Darwinism 
and such a wider teleology. This form of teleology, which Thomas Huxley affirmed, is “rooted 
in the deeper structure of the universe.”17 McGrath contends that it is possible to talk about di-
rectionality with regard to evolutionary development and that the “process of evolution at the 
physical, chemical, and biological levels shows a marked and essentially irreversible trend to-
ward complexity.”18 Does such directionality, and reality of wider teleology, allow us to talk 
about design? McGrath makes the case that the teleological dimension of evolution can be incor-
porated into a theological approach “which locates evidence of design in the values of the funda-
mental constants of nature, the laws of nature, and the creative role of ‘chance’ in bringing about 
novelty and development— all of which are subsumed under a generalized doctrine of divine 
providence.”19 A retrieved sense of teleology helps to shed light on God’s providential action 
within creation, and the doctrine of divine providence offers, in return, an explanation for why it 
is that evolution exhibits a form of immanent directionality. We see here how teleology is made 
theologically relevant.
In Eastern Orthodox theology, the teleological character of humanity and creation is brought 
together within the doctrine of theosis.20 As Jonathan Jacobs explains, theosis— the doctrine of 
deification— captures the Orthodox conception of the goal of human existence and the purpose 
of the whole of creation.21 This doctrine of deification, as Clement of Alexandria construed it, is 
about maximum possible assimilation to God: “Being baptized, we are illuminated; illuminated, 
we become sons; being made sons, we are made perfect; being made perfect, we are made im-
mortal.” Being deified, and to participate ontologically in the being of God, is the anthropologi-
cal telos of human creatures and creation as a whole. Theosis mediates, then, a robust teleology. 
According to Gösta Hallonsten, the very structure of theosis is “determined by a teleology that 
implies that creation and human beings from the very beginning are endowed with an affinity 
and likeness that potentially draws them to God.”22 Hence, here as well, we can see how teleol-
ogy forms a central component of a theological doctrine. Yet, as I discussed in the beginning of 
the article, it is commonly assumed that modern science makes teleology obsolete: many schol-
ars have accepted the judgement that mechanism has replaced purpose. The next section will 
describe the resurgence of teleology, with a particular emphasis on organismic teleology. In this 
way, I will show that teleology is not dead, neither is it scientifically obsolete.
Teleology Retrieved: From Mechanism to Organism
Teleology is at the centre of several theological doctrines. Humanity and creation, on these theo-
logical visions, are articulated in teleological terms. God acts purposefully within the physical 
17 Alister E. McGrath, Darwinism and the Divine: Evolutionary Thought and Natural Theology (Oxford: Wiley- 
Blackwell, 2011), 186.
18 McGrath, Darwinism and the Divine, 188.
19 Ibid., 20. My emphasis.
20 I develop this claim further in a forthcoming article, entitled “The Doctrine of Theosis and the Reality of Purpose: 
Exploring the Convergence between Deification and Organismic Teleology,” Toronto Journal of Theology.
21 Jonathan D. Jacobs, “An Eastern Orthodox conception of theosis and human nature,” Faith and Philosophy 26, no. 
5 (2009): 615- 627; 615.
22 Gösta Hallonsten, “Theosis in Recent Research: A Renewal of Interest and a Need for Clarity,” in Partakers of the 
Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions, eds. Michael J. Christensen and 
Jeffrey A. Wittung (Grand Rapids, MI: Rosemont Publishing Printing Corporation, 2007), 285.
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realm, and the final destinies of creation and humanity are understood in terms of an eschato-
logical future. For Catholic natural law theologians, we need to understand human nature in 
purposeful terms. A similar emphasis on the teleological character of human nature is placed 
within Eastern orthodoxy, according to which the final goal of human creatures is to reach union 
with God. From the Protestant perspectives of McCosh, Moore, and more recently McGrath, 
teleology plays a crucial role for understanding God’s providential activity in the natural domain.
However, in contrast to these teleological pictures, it is commonly asserted that the structure 
of Darwinian evolution excludes teleology and final purposes within nature. Darwin had, as 
Huxley famously said, delivered the “death- blow” to teleology.23 Before the arrival of Darwin’s 
theory we needed the categories of purpose to explain the mechanisms of nature, but now those 
mechanisms are employed to explain the appearance of purpose. Indeed, the success of Darwin 
was that he provided an efficient cause for evolutionary change and development, namely natural 
selection. One further promise of Darwinian evolution is that it seemingly removed the need of 
metaphysics from the arena of biology. That is, the proponents of such Darwinism “suggest that 
the use of the mechanistic framework is necessary in that it curtails vitalistic and teleological 
views of life from entering into objective science, in so doing offering a ‘non- metaphysical’ ac-
count of nature.”24 Many factors are important for explaining this dramatic change, most notably 
the discovery of the structure of DNA, the increased understanding of protein synthesis, the se-
quencing of genomes, and a strengthened epistemic credibility of methodological mechanism.25 
These powerful discoveries brought biology closer to modern mechanistic thinking and further 
away from the vitalistic philosophies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As Ernst Mayr 
explains, “As a result, by the time of the evolutionary synthesis of the 1940s, no competent biol-
ogist was left who still believed in any final causation of evolution or of the world as a whole.”26 
Thus, the main task for today’s biologists is to translate teleological categories to efficient 
causation and mechanistic vocabularies.
However, as Michael Ruse points out, such “biological house- cleaning has proven uncom-
monly difficult.”27 A main problem with this house- cleaning effort is the philosophically- 
mistaken assumption that one can reduce higher- order biological systems to their constituent 
parts. John Dupré has argued that this sort of reductionism seems problematic for the reason that 
the properties of the constituents need to be understood in relation to the larger system.28 The 
reductionist principle (RP) suggests that all there is to know about a biological entity/system is 
fully explicable in terms of the chemical makeup of the entity/system in question. If we have a 
full description of the lower- level base, then it is possible in principle to deduce or derive the 
higher- level system. That is, “a fully detailed simulation of the interactions among the 
23 Bernard Lightman, “The Theology of Victorian Scientific Naturalists,” in Science Without God? Rethinking the 
History of Scientific Naturalism, eds. Peter Harrison and Jon H. Roberts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 242.
24 Adam C. Scarfe, “Introduction: On a ‘Life- Blind Spot’ in Neo- Darwinism’s Mechanistic Metaphysical Lens,” in 
Beyond Mechanism: Putting Life Back Into Biology, eds. Brian G. Henning and Adam C. Scarfe (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2013), 29.
25 This shift in thinking is explained in Denis Walsh, Organisms, Agency, and Evolution (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015).
26 Ernst Mayr, “The Idea of Teleology,” Journal of the History of Ideas 53, no.1 (1992): 117- 135; 119. For a full 
presentation of Mayr’s position, see his “The Multiple Meanings of Teleological,” in ed. Ernst Mayr, Towards a New 
Philosophy of Biology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 38- 66.
27 Michael Ruse, “Teleology in Biology: Is it a Cause for Concern?,” Trends in Ecology and Evolution 4, no. 2 
(February 1989): 51- 54; 51.
28 John Dupré, “It Is Not Possible to Reduce Biological Explanations to Explanations in Chemistry and/or Physics,” 
in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology, eds. Francisco J. Ayala and Robert Arp (Oxford: Wiley- Blackwell, 
2010).
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constituents would generate the behavior of the whole.”29 However, Dupré suggests that biolog-
ical systems exhibit a multitude of relational properties that seem difficult to square with any 
higher- to- lower systemic reduction: for example, an enzyme (most of them are proteins, but 
some are RNA molecules) have multiple functions. As Dupré goes on to argue, “the intrinsic 
properties of a large and complex molecule such as a protein will very likely allow it to catalyze 
many different reactions,” and many proteins do have multiple functions.30 Indeed, the “number 
of possible functions of a protein molecule seems, in principle, quite indefinite.”31 In this way, 
the complete knowledge of the physical and chemical properties of a given protein will, in fact, 
not explain the function of the protein. This is because the capacities of a thing “depend on the 
relationship between the thing and the environment in which it exists.”32 Given the importance 
of environmental factors for understanding the function of biological systems, some argue that 
such systems are multiply realizable, meaning that their functions are partly determined by envi-
ronmental factors. This has been emphasized within the emerging research- paradigm of evolu-
tionary development, or Evo- devo, which focuses on phenotypic plasticity and epigenetics.33
Many thinkers have singled out the very nature of the organism as the main source of resis-
tance to mechanistic- causal explanations within biology.34 The reductionist framework of 
Descartes has, as William Bechtel remarks, proven itself remarkably valuable and has generated 
distinctive contributions within the life sciences. It is therefore unsurprising that biologists typi-
cally appeal to mechanisms, in contrast to theories or laws, when offering scientific explana-
tions.35 The basic mechanistic account, within the biological domain, assumes that a mechanism 
is “generating a phenomenon (e.g., protein synthesis) through a start- to- finish sequence of qual-
itatively characterized operations performed by component parts.”36 Scientists have outlined in 
great detail the “sequential operations of the RNA polymerase initiating the transcription of DNA 
into mRNA, the transport of mRNA (as well as tRNA and rRNA) into the cytoplasm, the opera-
tion of tRNA in pairing amino acids with codons on the mRNA, and finally the folding of the 
protein.”37 The job of the scientist is to describe the sequence of operations and the conditions 
that led to the production of the relevant biological phenomenon. The mechanistic explanatory 
model adopts a step- by- step view of the biological world in general and organisms in particular. 
Yet, as Bechtel goes on to argue, organisms are characterized by autonomy— the organism main-
tains its own existence by virtue of self- constructing processes and through interaction with its 
environment. However, simple “sequential organization allows only aggregation of component 
operations, and so it is insufficient to explain autonomy.”38 Because the organism engages in 





33 Brian K. Hall, “Epigenesis, Epigenetics, and the Epigenotype: Towards an Inclusive Concept of Development and 
Evolution,” in Henning and Scarfe, Beyond Mechanism, 345- 69; Adam C. Scarfe, “Epigenetics, Soft Inheritance, 
Mechanistic Metaphysics, and Bioethics,” in Henning and Scarfe, Beyond Mechanism.
34 Walsch, Organisms; William Bechtel, “Mechanism and Biological Explanation,” Philosophy of Science 78, no. 4 
(October 2011); 553- 57; William J. FitzPatrick, Teleology and the Norms of Nature (New York: Garland, 2000); Philip 
Clayton, “Machines and Organisms,” in Henning and Scarfe, Beyond Mechanism.
35 William C. Wimsatt, “Reductive Explanation: A Functional Account,” in Proceedings of the 1974 Meeting of the 
Philosophy of Science Association, eds. R. S. Cohen and A. Michalos (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1976).
36 Bechtel, “Mechanism and Biological Explanation,” 543.
37 Ibid., 537.
38 Ibid., 544.
39 On the idea of teleology as self- perfecting activity, see David S. Oderberg, Real Essentialism (New York: 
Routledge, 2007).
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independent parts given that the function of regeneration spans across the whole organism and 
all interrelated process cycles.40 Mere sequential organization cannot capture this phenomenon. 
According to Dupré, in order to understand the components of an organism and its overall func-
tionality, we need to consider the processes of the whole. In philosophy of biology, this issue has 
also been expressed as the many- many problem: “Typically, there are many genes in the bio-
chemical sense involved in the production of any one trait, and any one gene in the biochemical 
sense involved in the production of many different traits. Context determines how a gene will 
operate.”41 This conclusion, however, goes against both strong and weak reductionism.42
Given the failure of a mechanistic ontology as it pertains to the nature of organismic activity, 
some have argued for the plausibility of attributing teleological categories to biological organ-
isms.43 It is possible to locate teleology in the whole- part relation in biological organisms, and to 
argue that biological organization as such is intrinsically teleological. Matteo Mossio and 
Leonardo Bich have argued that biological organization is intrinsically teleological in the way 
that it is oriented toward an end.44 In a Kantian manner, they seek to bring out the teleological 
character of organization through the concept of self- determination, whereby B “determines it-
self in the sense that the effects of its activity contribute to establish and maintain its own condi-
tions of existence: in slogan form, biological systems are what they do.”45 That is, B produces 
effects which maintain the organization of B. This form of teleology is real and intrinsic (com-
pared to human artefacts which possess extrinsic teleology. I will return to this distinction later). 
Stuart Kauffman has framed the situation in similar terms, by positing the idea that an organism 
“acts on its own behalf.”46 We find a similar theme expressed within Humberto Mataranas and 
Francisco Varela’s very influential theory of autopoietic systems.47 In contrast to the adaptionist 
programme within biology, which reduces teleology to teleonomy, the autopoietic approach to 
biological development locates teleology in the self- organizational and self- preserving activity 
of physical entities. These activities are natural purposes.48 In this way, autopoiesis is inevitably 
circular in the sense that “parts of an organism are there through the existence of the whole and 
40 Bechtel, “Mechanism and Biological Explanation,” 544.
41 Edward Feser, Aristotle’s Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundation of Physical and Biological Science (Neunkirchen- 
Seelscheid: Editiones Scholasticae, 2019), 384.
42 Richard Brandon defines strong reductionism as the view that “posits a single basic level in terms of which all 
natural phenomena can be explained.” Weak reductionism, somewhat more plausible than its stronger counterpart, does 
not posit a single basic explanatory level, but it claims that for every phenomenon “there is a lower level in terms of 
which the focal level can be explained.” See Richard Brandon, “Reductionism Versus Holism Versus Mechanism,” in 
Concepts and Methods in Evolutionary Theory, ed. Richard Branson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
189.
43 Some scholars maintain that teleology exists beyond the biological realm, in even the simplest features of the 
world. Thomas Nagel has controversially argued that teleology goes all the way down. See Thomas Nagel, Mind and 
Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo- Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012). On his view, there are “natural teleological laws governing the development of organization over time, in 
addition to laws of the familiar kind [efficient causation] governing the behavior of the elements” (Nagel, Mind and 
Cosmos, 67). For Nagel, this “postmaterialist view” might be able to offer an adequate account of how “the physical and 
the mental characteristics of organisms developed together” (Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, 46- 47).
44 Matteo Mossio and Leonardo Bich, “What Makes Biological Organisation Teleological?,” Synthese 194 (2017): 
1089- 1114.
45 Ibid., 1090.
46 Stuart Kauffman, Investigations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Kauffman, Reinventing the Sacred: A 
New View of Science, Reason, and Religion (New York: Basic Books, 2008).
47 Humberto Maturana and Fancisco J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living (Boston: 
Reidel, 1980).
48 Andreas Weber and Francisco J. Varela, “Life after Kant: Natural Purposes and the Autopoietic Foundations of 
Biological Individuality,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1, no. 2 (June 2002): 97- 125; 106.
8 Mikael Leidenhag
© 2021 The Authors. Modern Theology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
the whole is responsible for the parts.”49 This relation between cause and effect is, moreover, 
strictly intrinsic to the organism.50
Autopoietic biology “provides a link with empirical biology and thus a link to a re- 
understanding of teleology as intrinsic or endogenous.”51 Organisms exhibit robustness and plas-
ticity. Robust and plastic organisms produce particular types of responses in their respective 
environments because these responses are survival- conducive. Hence, these activities and re-
sponses are “manifestations of organismal purposiveness.”52 This sort of phenotypic plasticity, 
according to Denis Walsh, contributes positively to adaptive evolution and the production of 
biological novelties. As he concludes, “Evolution is adaptive, because organisms are adaptive, 
goal- directed systems.”53 If one follows these accounts of teleology, it seems as if biology is not 
necessarily post- Aristotelian. Aristotle’s view of life as “a self- moving thing” bears a strong re-
semblance to autopoiesis and the above emphasis on self- determination and organizational au-
tonomy. What we get here is very similar to the immanent causation of Aristotelian teleology, as 
discussed by Edward Feser. He writes, “A causal process is immanent when it originates within 
the agent and terminates within it in a way that tends toward the agent’s own self- perfection or 
completion.”54 This activity is self- perfecting, autopoietic, and intrinsic to the organism.
The nature and behaviors of biological organisms pose a substantial challenge to the mechanis-
tic paradigm, which seeks to reduce the organism— ontologically and causally— to its component 
parts and the strata of chemistry and physics. Moreover, if a case can be made that teleological 
behavior is beyond reductionism, then it could be argued more positively that organisms are not 
merely passive entities— in the sense that they are the result of physical configurations— but they 
also might play an active role in evolutionary development.
This non- reductionist picture of biological organization suggests, then, that nature is not de-
void of telos. Nature is not a purposeless realm, reducible to sheer mechanical interactions and 
processes. This engagement with the new voices of teleology within the biological commu-
nity shows a different conception of nature, more congruent with the teleological depictions of 
human nature and creation that we find within Catholic, Protestant, and Eastern Orthodox tradi-
tions. However, if it is the case that nature displays a form of intrinsic purposefulness, how do 
we square this with the broadly theological claim that teleology is made possible by the creative 
and providential activity of God?
Purpose For and Within Creation: Balancing Extrinsic and Intrinsic Teleology
This article argues against the common opinion that it is possible, and desirable, to reduce tel-
eology to non- teleological phenomena. I have explored the recent focus on organismic teleol-
ogy and the abandonment of mechanistic categories. I also considered how crucial theological 
concepts hinge on the reality of teleology— as in the case of Catholic Natural Law tradition 
and in the ways that deification/theosis is articulated by scholars of the Eastern Orthodox tradi-
tion. For many within a broadly Protestant tradition, a wider teleology aids in clarifying God’s 
49 Ibid.
50 How to construe the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic teleology is an ongoing debate in biology. In Evan 
Thompson’s work, we find both an intrinsic teleology of self- making, but also an extrinsic orientation toward an organ-
ism’s environment— i.e., self- making— which reveals its normative structure. See Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, 
Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 138.
51 Weber and Varela, “Life after Kant,” 116.
52 Walsch, Organisms, 202.
53 Ibid., 203.
54 Feser, Aristotle’s Revenge, 375. I will return later to Feser’s Aristotelian approach to teleology.
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providential action in the natural domain. If we follow some of the voices within these theo-
logical traditions, we should expect the existence of teleology, functions, goals, and purposes in 
nature. Teleology would not be an anomaly in such a world.
My general ambition has been to show that the form of teleology that we find within the natural 
order can a) be made safe from reductionist attempts, and b) be accommodated within a theological 
framework. The section on teleology above explored various ways of grounding teleological behav-
ior, i.e. self- maintaining and self- organization, in the ontology of organisms. In such organismic 
behavior, we see the manifestation of “intrinsic teleology,” namely “goal- orientated behavior which 
belongs to something by virtue of what it is.”55 Organisms are teleological by virtue of being organ-
isms. On the other hand, organismic behavior also exhibits an “extrinsic teleology,” which refers “to 
an entity which is essentially inert or passive and which has teleological orientation imposed from 
without.”56 On a theological reading of teleology, God is in some sense the ontological source, au-
thor, and sustainer of such phenomena. However, one worry at this point might be that this push 
towards intrinsic teleology makes divine providence superfluous, meaning that intrinsic teleology is 
bought at the expense of extrinsic teleology. A deistic conclusion from what has just been said about 
teleology might be that God has gifted creatures with certain teleological potentialities and then 
stepped back from creation. This would allow us to secure a form of intrinsic teleology, but God’s 
ongoing contribution to the unfolding of creation would be called into question. If this were the case, 
organismic teleology would not shed light on divine providence, it would simply make it redundant. 
The various accounts of organismic teleology would then pave the way for a naturalistic worldview, 
rather than serving as possible models of God’s providential action in the physical order. Once 
again, we need to find a way to frame the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic teleology in a 
non- competitive manner. I will briefly highlight a theological model of creation that has gained 
some traction in the theology- science discussion in order to show what my proposal is not saying— 
after which I will venture into the domains of Aristotelianism and Thomism to find a better model.
In light of the purported problems of an interventionist view of God, Howard Van Till has 
opted for a view of divine activity based on the ontological assumption of creation as “gifted.” 
God has gifted creation with the necessary ontological ingredients for it to successively manifest 
inanimate structures and biotic forms over longer periods of time.57 God does not have to sus-
pend or break the laws of nature to accomplish something within the natural order. Rather, phys-
ical reality is organised in such a way that creation can, by its own accord, manifest God’s will 
through divinely ordered self- organizational principles. Van Till formulated his view of creation 
in direct opposition to those perspectives, including Intelligent Design, that subscribe to the no-
tion of “episodic creationism,” whereby God at certain points of time in natural history produces 
phenomena in ways that defy scientific explanation. This is a form of theological compatibilism, 
which seeks to render theism compatible with the broadly naturalistic assertion that the natural 
world is complete— there are no gaps in it that we need to plug with supernatural explanations.58 
55 Simon Oliver, “Teleology Revived? Cooperation and the Ends of Nature,” Studies in Christian Ethics 26, no. 2 
(May 2013): 158- 165.
56 Ibid., 160 (emphasis mine).
57 Howard Van Till, “The Creation: Intelligently Designed or Optimally Equipped?” in Intelligent Design Creationism 
and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological, and Scientific Perspectives, ed. Robert T. Pennock (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2001).
58 This way of maintaining the completeness of nature seems to entail a commitment to what is usually called “the 
causal closure principle,” which suggests that no physical event has a cause outside the physical realm. See, for example, 
Jaegwon Kim, Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 280. See also David Papineau, “The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Philosophy of Mind, eds. Ansgar Beckermann, Brian P. McLaughlin, and Sven Walter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009).
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Van Till’s view of divine action means that God’s secondary causation is already contained in 
primary causation: everything unfolds due to God’s initial act of bringing creation into 
existence.
Van Till’s view of divine providence offers a possible model for placing intrinsic teleology in 
the natural domain. On his account, God’s action could be construed as providing creation with 
teleological principles— such as self- organizational tendencies— which yield complex phenom-
ena over longer periods of time. Although this account would surely ground intrinsic teleology 
in an adequate manner, the risk is that it either makes human freedom impossible or it pushes 
divine providence out of the picture. I elaborated on such a theological risk with Van Till’s model 
in another article.59 If we consider Van Till’s model in a stronger form, God would have set up 
the universe and its progressive unfolding in a deterministic fashion. Like a pre- programmed 
machine, creation would simply obey the programmer’s software code. However, if the universe 
was created in such a deterministic way, then what sense could we make of human freedom in 
such a world? William Alston has argued that the cost of such theistic determinism would be that 
it would no longer be possible to treat some events and not others as instantiated by God.60 Such 
implications would be theologically problematic. Some form of intrinsic teleology could be pre-
served if we adopted Van Till’s model, but it would be bought at the cost of challenging the belief 
in libertarian agency of natural creatures, as well as the belief in God’s active presence in the 
world.
We need another theological framework that will both balance intrinsic and extrinsic teleol-
ogy, and to formulate such teleology in a way that it would not threaten the conception of a 
sustaining and revelatory God. Can such a balance be achieved? Andrè Ariew has argued that 
there are essentially two mutually excluding ways to ground teleology in nature— although both 
positions eschew the materialistic explaining away of purpose.61 One can go with the Platonic 
Teleologist who explains orderliness through higher or supernatural agency. This is an example 
of external teleology, given that the orderliness and purposiveness of natural phenomena are 
grounded in divine design— in the Platonic demiurge. One can also go with the Aristotelian ex-
planation of teleology, which is very much a “via media between reductive materialism defended 
by a variety of Ionian natural philosophers and the natural theology of Plato’s Timaeus.”62 On 
this account, the teleological structures that we see in various natural phenomena are not the 
“handiwork of a creator; rather they are due to some inner principle of change within living or-
ganisms.”63 Aristotle was of course a theist, yet he saw no reason to explain the telos of organ-
isms through divine intentionality or will. If we follow Ariew, we would have to simply conclude 
that there is no way of bringing together extrinsic and intrinsic teleology in a positive way. We 
need either to adopt the transcendent or supernatural teleology of Plato, or to approach teleolog-
ical phenomena from an Aristotelian perspective and articulate the purposive behavior of natural 
agents in terms of immanent principles.
In response to Ariew’s either- or picture, Edward Feser demonstrates how one can balance 
extrinsic and intrinsic teleology through an Aristotelian- Thomistic metaphysical framework. 
59 Mikael Leidenhag, “The Blurred Line Between Theistic Evolution and Intelligent Design,” Zygon: Journal of 
Religion and Science 54, no. 4 (December 2019): 909- 31.
60 William P. Alston, “Divine Action or Divine Substance?” in The God Who Acts: Philosophical and Theological 
Explorations, ed. Thomas F. Tracy (Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 1994), 41- 62.
61 Andrè Ariew, “Teleology,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Biology, eds. David L. Hull and 
Michael Ruse (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
62 James G. Lennox, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Biology: Studies in the Origins of Life Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 228.
63 Ariew, “Teleology,” 161.
Purpose  for and  within Creation 11
© 2021 The Authors. Modern Theology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Like the Aristotelian, Feser preserves the idea of teleology as intrinsic to organismic activities— 
the teleological nature of X follows from the essence of X. But Feser also grounds teleology in a 
divine source in a Thomistic fashion. As Feser goes on to explain, this proposal amounts to the 
middle- path of Scholastic Teleological Realism. While there is intrinsic teleology in nature, such 
teleology is ultimately explained by the divine intellect.64
Given that the orderliness of creation is grounded in divine intentionality, the critic might ac-
cuse this scholastic proposal of paving the way for a theology of Intelligent Design (ID). It is 
certainly the case that the Aristotelian- Thomistic (A- T) framework shares with ID the belief that 
teleology owes its existence to an outside source (certainly, it seems that any theist who is also a 
teleological realist would have to say that such purpose in nature is made possible by God— 
either through direct action, indirect action, or by sustaining creation). However, Feser’s A- T 
framework differs substantially from ID when it comes to inferring “design” from natural phe-
nomena. Feser helpfully explains the difference between A- T and ID in terms of the employment 
of two different explanatory strategies about natural purposes. For ID, the conclusion that God is 
the author of teleology follows directly from the improbability of various biological complexities 
emerging through natural causation alone— that is, in the absence of divine activity. The Thomist 
would say in light of the evidence for purpose that an “intermediate step in the argumentation is 
required.”65 Moreover, the Aristotelian teleologist says that the reality of intrinsic teleology in 
nature “has nothing at all to do with the complexity or the weighing of probabilities.”66 Teleology 
exists necessarily within organisms whose essential natures realize or instantiate teleological 
behavior. Teleology therefore has nothing to do with irreducible complexity within biological 
systems, or with specified complexity within DNA- structures (in contrast to Michael Behe and 
Stephen Meyer).67 My concern with the ID- movement’s general argument is that extrinsic tele-
ology is bought at the cost of intrinsic teleology. Intelligent design produces a view of creation 
as a mere artefact— evidently, such an understanding of creation aligns itself closer to the me-
chanical conception of nature espoused by seventeenth- century natural philosophers.68 The 
Thomistic approach, as exemplified by Aquinas’s Fifth Way, amounts to something rather differ-
ent as God enters the explanatory level at a different and later stage compared to ID theories. 
First (1), the Scholastic philosopher notes that there is irreducible and immanent teleology within 
nature. From that observation it is argued that (2) such teleology is unintelligible without an 
extra- natural intellect. From (1) and (2) it is concluded that there is an “intellect outside the nat-
ural order” which endowed natural agents with intrinsic teleology.69
What I have said so far about organismic teleology, then, is fully consistent with a broader 
framework that affirms God’s active presence within the dynamics of evolution. Organismic 
teleology can be reconciled with theistic evolution. The reality of teleology, even when placed 
within a theological framework, does not necessitate the theology of Intelligent Design. Hence, 
affirming purpose within the biological world would not inexorably force the Catholic, Protestant, 
and Eastern Orthodox teleologies to take the problematic route of Intelligent Design.
64 Feser, Aristotle’s Revenge, 417.
65 Edward Feser, “Teleology: A Shopper’s Guide,” Philosophia Christi 12, no. 1 (2010): 142- 159;148.
66 Ibid., 155.
67 Michael J. Behe, Darwin’s Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution (New York: Free Press, 2006); 
Stephen C. Meyer, Signature in the Cell: DNA and the Evidence for Intelligent Design (New York: HarperCollins, 2009).
68 Simon Oliver, Creation: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2017), 116- 124.
69 Feser, “Teleology,” 158- 59.
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Conclusion
Teleology has been linked to crucial doctrines and beliefs across several theological traditions. 
Within some versions of Catholic Natural Law Theory, it has been suggested that the very con-
cept of human nature rests firmly on the possibility of construing human becoming, and the natu-
ral order in general, in teleological terms. Likewise, notable thinkers in the Eastern Orthodox 
tradition assume a vision of human nature in the doctrine of theosis that is intrinsically teleo-
logical: deification assumes an underlying teleology for humanity and the wider cosmos. Within 
the Protestant tradition, teleology has been used to frame God’s providence in an evolutionary 
universe. Instead of undermining the idea of final causality in nature, thinkers such as James 
McCosh, Aubrey Moore, and Alister McGrath suggest that evolutionary science gives credence 
to a “wider teleology” in the universe. Such a wider teleology is fully consistent with the evo-
lutionary emphasis on natural selection, and it provides important resources for framing God’s 
active presence.
For many thinkers, evolution poses a significant challenge to purpose, goals, or any form 
of wider teleology in nature. Due to Darwin’s insights, it was possible to replace Aristotelian, 
theistic, and vitalistic notions of purpose with a purely physical mechanism, hence offering the 
opportunity of explaining evolutionary developments in materialist terms. This article offers 
another view on the situation by analysing the possibility of understanding organisms as teleo-
logical. Drawing on several theories and proposals within philosophy of biology, I have argued 
that organismic activities go beyond the logic of reductionism. And, more positively, I go on to 
suggest that the very nature of organisms is teleological. This means that wherever there is an 
organism, we have natural purposes. All of this is certainly congruent with an Aristotelian con-
ception of natural agents.
The final section discussed the issue of balancing intrinsic and extrinsic teleology, and whether 
or not a theological accommodation of teleology makes the idea of intrinsic teleology superfluous. 
Does the notion of God as the author of teleological phenomena turn organisms into mere arte-
facts? And, more worrisome, do we open up the door for intelligent design in virtue of connecting 
teleology to God’s providence? I responded to both concerns through a theological framework that 
brings together Aristotelian metaphysics with a Thomistic theology. While this A- T framework 
grants the existence of intrinsic teleology (in an Aristotelian fashion), it also suggests that such 
teleology must ultimately be explained by divine agency (the Thomistic conclusion). My tentative 
suggestion is that an A- T ontology can provide the necessary conceptual tools for balancing the 
intrinsic purposefulness of biological organisms with extrinsic teleology. Moreover, this way of 
framing God’s action within nature is significantly different to the preferred strategy of those in 
the intelligent design community. For instance, A- T does not infer divine intentionality from or-
ganismic teleology by weighing probabilities— given that organisms are necessarily teleological. 
In addition, the A- T proponent would suggest that an intermediate step is required for us to justi-
fiably infer divine action from the goal- directed nature of biological organisms.
Even though some of these conclusions are tentative and need to be developed further, I nev-
ertheless want to stress that theologians ought to engage with the resurgence of teleological ac-
counts in philosophy of biology in order to avoid a problematic dualism between life and non- life, 
mind and matter, and between God’s providence and natural processes. By re- discovering the 
teleological structure of nature, we can hopefully overcome the overly mechanistic conception 
of the world which has caused so much anxiety within contemporary theology. In doing so, a 
retrieved teleology can shed light on purpose for and within creation.70
70 I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their many helpful suggestions and comments.
